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Abstract
We examine the dynamics of output growth and in￿ ation in the US, Euro area and
UK using a structural time varying coe¢ cient VAR. There are important similarities in
structural in￿ ation dynamics across countries; output growth dynamics di⁄er. Swings
in the magnitude of in￿ ation and output growth volatilities and persistences are ac-
counted for by a combination of three structural shocks. Changes over time in the
structure of the economy are limited and permanent variations largely absent. Changes
in the volatilities of structural shocks matter.
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11 Introduction
The dynamics of output growth and in￿ ation have been the focus of intense research over
the last 35 years and the question of what causes ￿ uctuations in these two variables is
still unsettled. Recently, the literature has turned to documenting the time pro￿le of the
dynamics of these two variables. For example, Blanchard and Simon (2000), McConnell
and Perez Quiroz (2001), Sargent and Cogley (2001) and Stock and Watson (2003) report
a decline in the volatility of real activity and in￿ ation in the US and a reduction in the
persistence of in￿ ation since the early 1980s; Benati (2004) detects signi￿cant shifts in
the volatility and the persistence of UK in￿ ation; Batini (2002), Gadzinski and Orlandi
(2004), O￿ Really and Whelan (2004) ￿nd visual evidence of changes but little support for a
once-and-for-all break in the time pro￿le of in￿ ation dynamics in the Euro area.
What are the reasons for these changes? Two possibilities are often suggested. First,
that the mechanism through which exogenous disturbances spread to the economy and prop-
agate over time has changed as a result of alterations in the preferences of consumers and/or
policymakers, or the objective function of ￿rms. Second, that the shocks that perturb the
economy have changed magnitude and frequency over time. Changes in policymakers￿pref-
erences have been discussed at length. For example, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000),
Cogley and Sargent (2001) and (2005) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) have argued that
monetary policy was ￿ loose￿in ￿ghting in￿ ation in the 1970s but became more aggressive
since the early 1980s. Leeper and Zha (2003), Sims and Zha (2006), Canova and Gambetti
(2004), Primiceri (2005) and others are critical of this view since they estimate stable policy
rules and ￿nd the transmission of policy shocks roughly unchanged over time.
While it is often stressed that in￿ ation is a monetary phenomena and popular sticky
price New-Keynesian models give a powerful role to monetary policy - stabilizing output
implies in￿ ation stabilization, policy shocks are only a minor source of variation in real
activity and other shocks account for a large percentage of in￿ ation ￿ uctuations at business
cycle frequencies. For example, productivity disturbances, either of neutral, or of investment
speci￿c type, have been found to be important in generating real cyclical ￿ uctuations. Given
that the increase in productivity of the 1990s was, to a large extent, unexpected (see e.g.
Gordon (2004)), one may conceive that changes in the dynamics of productivity disturbances
may account for the time variations observed, not only in the period, but also in the whole
sample. Similarly, the way ￿scal policy was conducted in the late 1970s and the early 1980s
di⁄ered considerably from the way it was conducted in the 1990s. Hence, ￿scal policy could
also potentially explain changes in the dynamics of output and in￿ ation. Gambetti, et. al.
2(2005) ￿nd that, indeed, a portion of the observed variations in the dynamics of US output
and in￿ ation is due to changes in the way technological and ￿scal disturbances spread to
the economy and to a decline in their volatility.
This evidence is suggestive about the nature of the changes but it leaves the question of
whether idiosyncratic or global factors are behind the observed variations open. There are
reasons to believe that both arguments could be valid. In the last 35 years, the US economy
has witnessed a number of speci￿c changes, which go from alterations in the management
of inventories and production (see McConnell and Perez Quiroz (2001)), to ￿nancial market
deregulation (see Blanchard and Simon (2001)), to sectorial and labour market changes.
On the other hand, the shocks hitting the US economy have also become more global in
nature. Hence, an international perspective may help to evaluate not only whether changes
in the dynamics are common across countries but also whether common explanations can
be found and, therefore, help designing policies which e⁄ectively deal with these changes
and ￿ exibly adapt to an evolving macroeconomic environment.
This paper investigates the nature and the causes of the structural changes in the dy-
namics of output growth and in￿ ation in the US, the UK and the Euro area. While some
structural evidence exists for the US and the UK (see e.g. Gambetti et. al. (2005), and
Benati and Mumtaz (forthcoming)), only reduced form, time series and micro based evi-
dence on the dynamics of in￿ ation exist for the Euro area. We therefore contribute to the
literature in two distinct ways; we jointly examine output growth and in￿ ation dynamics
from a structural point of view; and we compare sources of structural variations across
countries.
Since many interesting issues could be addressed, we gear our investigation to answer
three main questions. First, are there structural changes in the volatility and the persistence
of output growth and in￿ ation? Are they comparable in size and timing across countries?
Second, what are the reasons for these changes? Do they re￿ ect time variations in the
transmission or in the size and the nature of structural shocks? Third, are there common
sources of variations across countries?
To address these questions we employ time varying coe¢ cients VAR models, where
coe¢ cients evolve according to a nonlinear transition equation and use Markov Chain Monte
Carlo methods to estimate the posterior distribution of the quantities of interest.
We identify three types of structural shocks (roughly, technology, real demand and mon-
etary disturbances) using robust sign restrictions. These restrictions naturally arise in a
large class of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models; they are uncontro-
versial, since they are common to both RBC style and New-Keynesian style models and
3robust, in the sense they hold regardless of the parameterisation and of the nature of the
policy rules (see e.g. Gambetti et. al. (2005)). Since the systems we examine are of small
scale, and therefore potentially subject to speci￿cation and interpretation problems, we also
study whether the shocks we recover proxy for other sources of structural disturbances, for
example, oil shocks, or omitted variables, such as in￿ ation expectations, both of which are
typically thought to matter for the dynamics of output growth and in￿ ation.
The results of our investigation can be summarized as follows. We show that there are
important similarities in the structural dynamics of in￿ ation across countries over the last
35 years. However, structural output growth dynamics acquired signi￿cant cross country
similarities only since the early 1990s. Swings in the magnitude of volatilities and persistence
are typically accounted for by a combination of all three structural shocks. We document
that sources of in￿ ation persistence and volatility are similar but that sources of output
growth dynamics vary across countries. Within a country, sources of output growth and
in￿ ation variations are di⁄erent.
Time variations in the structure of the three economies appear to have been limited in
time and scope and permanent shifts, in one direction or another, are largely absent. The
1970s in the US and the UK and the 1990s in the US are notable exceptions. Changes in
the volatilities of structural shocks are as least as important as changes in the structure to
account for the evidence. In general, it is impossible to explain the Great In￿ ation of the
1970s and the substantive output growth of the 1990s with one single explanation. In the US
changes in the transmission and in the variability of demand shocks appear to be important;
in the Euro area changes in the transmission and the volatility of monetary policy shocks
and in the volatility of supply shocks matter; in the UK changes in the transmission of
demand shocks and in the volatility of supply and monetary policy shocks account for the
observed output growth and in￿ ation dynamics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the empirical
framework used in the analysis. Section 3 deals with estimation issues and section 4 discusses
the identi￿cation restrictions. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 concludes.
2 The empirical model
Let yt be a 4 ￿ 1 vector of time series including real output growth, the in￿ ation rate, a
short term nominal rate and the growth rate of money with the representation
yt = A0;t +
p X
j=1
Aj;tyt￿j + "t (1)
4where A0;t is a 4 ￿ 1 vector; Aj;t, are 4 ￿ 4 matrices, for each j and "t is a 4 ￿ 1 Gaussian




t￿p], where 14 is a row vector of ones of length 4, using vec(￿) to denote the
stacking column operator and setting ￿t = vec(A0
t), we rewrite (1) as
yt = X0





t) is a 4 ￿ 4(4p + 1) matrix, I4 is a 4 ￿ 4 identity matrix, and ￿t is a
4(4p + 1) ￿ 1 vector. We assume that ￿t evolves according to
p(￿tj￿t￿1;￿) / I(￿t)f(￿tj￿t￿1;￿) (3)
where I(￿t) discards explosive paths of yt and f(￿tj￿t￿1;￿) is parametrized as
￿t = ￿t￿1 + ut (4)
where ut is a 4(4p + 1) ￿ 1 Gaussian white noise with zero mean, diagonal covariance ￿,
uncorrelated with "t. We discard explosive paths for ￿t as they would imply time series
which, with probability one, are at odds with the data we consider.
Note that our speci￿cation implies that the forecast errors of the model are non-normal
and heteroschedastic. In fact, substituting (4) into (2) we have that yt = X0
t￿t￿1+vt, where
vt = "t + X0
tut. We ￿nd such a structure appealing since whatever generates coe¢ cient
variations also imparts heteroschedastic movements to the variance of the forecasts errors.
Sims and Zha (2006) and Cogley and Sargent (2005) have used di⁄erent speci￿cations for
their VARs: the former assume that the variance of "t is a function of a Markov switching
indicator, while the latter allow for stochastic volatility in the variance of "t. Our speci￿-
cation do not explicitly model time variations in the variance of "t. However, our recursive
estimation approach non-parametrically allows ￿ to change over time. Hence, our proce-
dure will not underestimate the extent of time variations in the volatility in any meaningful
sense.
Let S be a square root of ￿, i.e., ￿ = SDS0, where D is a diagonal matrix; let Ht be an
orthonormal matrix, independent of "t, such that HtH0
t = I and set J￿1
t = H0
tS￿1. Jt is a
particular decomposition of ￿ which transforms (2) in two ways: it produces uncorrelated
innovations (via the matrix S) and it gives a structural interpretation to the equations of
the system (via the matrix Ht). Premultiplying yt by J￿1
t we obtain
J￿1





t Aj;tyt￿j + et (5)
5where et = J￿1
t "t satis￿es: E(et) = 0, E(ete0
t) = HtDH0
t. Equation (5) represents the
class of ￿ structural￿representations of interest: for example, a Choleski system is obtained
choosing S to be lower triangular matrix and Ht = I4, and more general patterns, with
non-recursive zero restrictions, result choosing S to be non-triangular and Ht = I4.
In this paper, S is an arbitrary square root matrix. Hence, identifying structural shocks
is equivalent to choosing Ht. We select Ht so that responses at t + k;k = 1;2;:::;K1,
satisfy certain sign restrictions. We prefer to identify structural shocks via sign restrictions
for three reasons. First, the contemporaneous zero restrictions conventionally used are often
absent from those models one uses to interpret the results. Second, standard decompositions
underidentify structural shocks whenever the economy is on an indeterminate path (see
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)). Third, sign restrictions do allow for time variations in the
magnitude of the responses to shocks. Clearly, since our identi￿cation restrictions are based
on inequality constraints, they do not deliver exact identi￿cation. A strategy to deal with
this multiplicity is outlined below.
Letting Ct = [J￿1
t A0t;:::;J￿1
t Apt], and ￿t = vec(C0
t), (5) can be written as
J￿1
t yt = X0
t￿t + et (6)
As in ￿xed coe¢ cient VARs, there is a mapping between the structural coe¢ cients ￿t and
the reduced form coe¢ cients ￿t since ￿t = (J￿1
t ￿ I4(p+1))￿t. Whenever I(￿t) = 1, we have
￿t = (J￿1
t ￿ I4(p+1))(J￿1
t￿1 ￿ I4(p+1))￿1￿t￿1 + ￿t (7)
where ￿t = (J￿1
t ￿ I4(p+1))ut. Hence, the vector of structural shocks ￿0
t = [e0
t;￿0
t]0 is a white











Note that the structural model contains two types of shocks: VAR disturbances, et, and
parameters disturbances, ￿t. In general, the latter do not have a clear economic interpre-
tation. However, for the equation representing a policy rule, they may capture changes in
the preferences of the monetary authority (see e.g. Canova and Gambetti (2004)).
To study the transmission of disturbances one typically employs impulse responses.
Impulse responses are generally computed as the di⁄erence between two realizations of
yi;t+k which are identical up to time t, but one assumes that between t and t+k a shock in
the j-th component of et+k occurs only at time t, and the other that no shocks take place
at all dates between t and t + k;k = 1;2;:::
In a TVC model, responses computed this way disregard the fact that structural coef-
￿cients may also change with the horizon k. Hence, meaningful response functions ought
to measure the e⁄ects of a shock in ejt on yit+k, allowing future shocks to the structural
6coe¢ cients to be non-zero. The responses we present are obtained as the di⁄erence between
two conditional expectations of yit+k. In both cases we condition on the history of the data
and of the coe¢ cients, on the structural parameters of the transition equation (which are
function of Jt) and all future shocks. However, in one case we condition on a draw for the
current shock, while in the other, the current shock is set to zero.
While our responses resemble the impulse response functions suggested by Gallant et al.
(1996), Koop et al. (1996) and Koop (1996), two important di⁄erences need to be noted.
First, our responses are history dependent but state independent - histories are not random
variables. Second, while responses to VAR disturbances are independent of the sign and
the size of the shocks (as with a ￿xed coe¢ cient model), the size and the sign of shocks to
the coe¢ cients may, in principle, matter for the dynamics of the system. For a shock in the








t+k;k￿1ej;t k = 2;3;::: (8)
where ￿t+k;k￿1 = Sn;n[(
Qk￿1
h=0 At+k￿h) ￿ Jt+1], At is the companion matrix of the VAR at





t+k;k￿1 is the column of ￿t+k;k￿1 corresponding to the j￿th shock.
When the coe¢ cients are constant and ej;t = 1 for t = 1 and zero otherwise, (8)
collapse to the traditional impulse response function to unitary structural shocks. In general,
IR
j
y(t;k) depends on the identifying matrix Jt, the history of the data and the dynamics of
the reduced form coe¢ cients up to time t.
The structural model (6)-(7) is estimated using Bayesian methods. We specify prior
distributions for the parameters and use the available data to compute posterior distrib-
utions for the reduced form parameters. Since an analytical expression for the marginal
posterior of the parameters of interest is unavailable we use the Gibbs sampler to construct
sequences from these distributions. Then, we use the identi￿cation restrictions detailed
below to recover the posterior distribution of structural shocks and structural parameters.
Finally, with these draws we compute posterior distributions for the statistics of interest.
Given the complexity of the estimation approach and heavy notation involved, we collect
the details of the construction of the posterior distributions for the structural parameters,
the structural shocks and the structural statistics in Appendix A.
73 The identi￿cation restrictions
Despite the fact that our empirical model has four variables, we will identify only three
structural shocks. We decided to leave one of the reduced form shocks unidenti￿ed for
two reasons. First, since such a residual shock acts as a bu⁄er, it captures the e⁄ects of
potentially omitted variables, leaving structural shocks relatively free of these variations -
in section 5 we show this is indeed the case. Such a separation would not be possible if
all VAR shocks are given a structural interpretation. Second, the presence of this shock
allows us to examine the reasonableness of our identi￿cation procedure. To the extent that
important theoretical disturbances, such as labour supply, investment speci￿c or in￿ ation
expectations shocks are left out of our analysis, the percentage of the variations in output
growth and in￿ ation explained by the identi￿ed shocks is a useful thermometer to judge the
soundness of our analysis. Table 1 presents our identi￿cation restrictions.
Table 1: Identi￿cation restrictions
Output growth In￿ ation Short rate Money growth
Technology ￿ 0 ￿ 0 ￿ 0 ￿ 0
Real Demand ￿ 0 ￿ 0 ￿ 0 ￿ 0
Monetary ￿ 0 ￿ 0 ￿ 0 ￿ 0
Technology shocks are disturbances displacing the aggregate supply curve, while both
real demand and monetary policy shocks are disturbances displacing the aggregate demand
curve. In both cases we do not require the other curve to be ￿xed: because of general equilib-
rium e⁄ects, it is allowed to move, but we require these movements to be small relative to the
ones we are interested in. To distinguish between real demand and monetary disturbances
we also require that monetary shocks generate liquidity e⁄ects (negative comovements be-
tween short term nominal rate and money growth) and that government spending shocks
produce positive comovements between money growth and short term nominal rates. Since
technology shocks must not increase money growth and the nominal rate, they are unlikely
to be confused with expectational shocks (see Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)).
While we take these restrictions o⁄-the-shelf, appendix B sketches a DSGE model which
generates them for a wide range of values of the parameters, di⁄erent monetary and ￿scal
policy rules and for a number of horizons. In this sense, the restrictions we use should be
considered robust. Notice also that, since only sign restrictions are employed, the intensity
of the e⁄ects is allowed to change over time. Our identi￿cation scheme, however, does
not permit the structural characteristics of the shocks to vary with time, i.e. a monetary
disturbance can not generate expected in￿ ation e⁄ects in one period and liquidity e⁄ects in
8another. When the list of identi￿ed shocks is rich enough this should not cause interpretation
problems.
There are many ways of imposing sign restrictions. The results we present are obtained
using an acceptance sampling scheme, where draws that jointly satisfy the whole set of
restrictions are kept and draws that do not are discarded. Alternative schemes, which give
di⁄erent weights to di⁄erent types of draws, or that allow for the possibility that with one
draw only a subset of the shocks is identi￿ed, produce qualitatively similar outcomes.
Since the sign restrictions we use are generic, we are free to choose how many responses
to constrain for identi￿cation purposes. There is an important trade-o⁄ to consider when
making this choice. When only a few horizons are restricted, shocks with di⁄erent medium-
long run implications could be confused. As the number of restricted responses increases,
the empirical analysis acquires a more structural character, but if restrictions are invalid,
inference is inappropriate and standard errors inaccurate. Since this trade-o⁄ is highly
nonlinear, it is di¢ cult to optimize. We present results obtained imposing restrictions at
two horizons (0 and 1), since this choice accounts for both concerns.
The VAR we use is the same for each country: it includes two lags of each variable and
an intercept. We maintain as much as possible comparability across countries. For output
we use real GDP, for the interest rate a short term 3 month rate and for money a narrow
measure (M1 for the US and the Euro area, M0 for the UK). In￿ ation is computed quarter
on quarter and annualized and measures GDP in￿ ation in the US and the Euro area and
retail price index in￿ ation for the UK. The sources of the data are the FREDII database at
the Fed of St.Louis, the ECB area wide model, and the Bank of England.
4 The Evidence
4.1 The structural dynamics of output growth and in￿ ation
Figures 1 to 3 present the structural dynamics of output growth and in￿ ation in the US,
the Euro area and the UK. We summarize the dynamic features of these two variables with
a measure of persistence and one of volatility and report the median and the highest 68%
band of the posterior for these structural statistics. Persistence is measured by the height
of the zero frequency of the spectrum; volatility by magnitude of the cumulative spectrum.
The sample di⁄ers across countries: data runs from 1959:1 to 2004:4 for the US; from 1970:1
to 2002:4 for the Euro area, and from 1963:1 to 2004:4 for the UK.
On average, in￿ ation has been more volatile and persistent in the UK than in the other
two countries. However, since di⁄erent price index series are used, these di⁄erences may
9re￿ ect measurement errors. Output growth looks like a white noise in the Euro area; it
displays some serial correlation in the UK, and is considerably more positively serially
correlated in the US, especially in the late 1990s. Output growth volatility has similar
magnitude in the US and the UK; while, probably because of the nature of the data, it is
much lower in the Euro area.
There are important common features in the time pro￿le of persistence and volatility of
in￿ ation across countries: both in￿ ation volatility and in￿ ation persistence are low in the
1960s; they increase dramatically in the early 1970s and peak in the middle of the decade;
they sharply decline up to 1980 and remain roughly at the 1980 level for the rest of the
sample, except in the UK, where a small peak in both statistics shows up in the middle of
1980s. The magnitude of the swings is quite large: the peak in all countries is about 3 times
as large as the average value after 1980. Posterior standard error bands are tight for US
and the UK statistics so that both measures have signi￿cantly increased and signi￿cantly
declined in the sample. For the Euro area error bands are larger and the case for evolving
volatility and persistence is much harder to make.
Output growth volatilities show interesting features. In the US and the UK there is a
clear U-shaped pattern. Volatility was about 30 % larger in the early part of the sample
than in the 1980s and the volatility recorded in 2000 is roughly of the same magnitude
as in the late 1960s-early 1970s. In the Euro area, on the other hand, we only observe
a marked increase in output growth volatility in the last 10 years of the sample. Output
growth persistence shows more heterogeneity across countries. In the US and the UK, there
is a considerable decline from the peak of the early 1970s to the through in the early 1980s
(50 % or more), while persistence in the Euro area temporarily increases around 1980. In
the last part of the sample, output growth persistence shows an increasing trend in the US,
and only a hint of an increase in the other two countries. Contrary to what happens for
in￿ ation, changes in output growth dynamics are insigni￿cant in all countries.
Overall, estimated US and UK structural in￿ ation dynamics broadly agree with those
obtained using reduced form methods (Cogley and Sargent (2005)), and other structural
analyses (e.g. Gambetti et al. (2005) and Benati and Mumtaz (forthcoming)), although the
speci￿cation of the VAR model and the variables used di⁄ers. Interestingly, the dynamics
of output persistence di⁄er somewhat from the time series characterization of Stock and
Watson (2003).
10Table 2 Cross Correlations
US-Euro US-UK Euro-UK US Euro UK
In￿ ation Persistence 0.96 0.84 0.91
In￿ ation Volatility 0.97 0.87 0.92
Output growth Persistence 0.62 0.80 0.51
Output growth Volatility 0.19 0.87 0.45
Output growth-in￿ ation persistence 0.48 0.41 0.52
Output growth-in￿ ation volatility 0.54 -0.29 0.15
Table 2, which reports a few cross contemporaneous correlations for the median values
of the posterior distributions of the two variables within and across countries, reiterates
the presence of important similarities in the cross-country dynamics of in￿ ation (see also
Ciccarelli and Mojon (2005) and Mumtaz and Surico (2006)); con￿rms the presences of an
Anglo-Saxon real cycle, documented with other techniques in Canova, et. al. (forthcoming);
and highlights that the real Euro area cycle is di⁄erent, for at least two-thirds of the sample.
Interestingly, correlations computed using the domestic dynamics of output growth and
in￿ ation are considerably smaller than those obtained using one of the two variables across
countries. Hence, while the swings in in￿ ation persistence and volatilities over the last
35 years look like a global phenomenon, those of output growth are still, to some extent,
country speci￿c. As a consequence, what explains changes in the dynamics of in￿ ation is
unlikely to explain also changes in output growth, both within and across countries.
4.2 What drives changes in structural volatility and persistence?
To study what drives the changes documented in ￿gures 1-3, we use a simple decomposition.
First, the (time varying) structural MA representation of the VAR in each country can
be written as yt =
P4
i=1 ￿it(‘)eit, where eit is orthogonal to ei0t, i0 6= i, and where, for
simplicity, we have omitted deterministic components from the representation. Second,
since the spectrum at frequency ￿ is uncorrrelated with the spectrum at frequency ￿0, if ￿
and ￿0 are Fourier frequencies, and since structural shocks are independent by construction,
the (local) spectrum of yjt at frequency ￿ is Syj(￿)(t) =
P4
i=1 j￿it(￿)j2Sei(￿)(t). Given this
expression, the contribution to the persistence of yjt of structural shock i is Si
yj(￿ = 0)(t) =




yj(￿)(t), where yjt is either output growth or in￿ ation. As it is clear from their
construction, these measures are comparable to historical decomposition statistics. The
latter tells us the relative contribution of di⁄erent shocks at various forecasting horizons;
11the measures we construct evaluate the contribution of structural shock i to the evolution
of the spectrum of yjt at the zero frequency or cumulatively across frequencies.
To start with we would like to mention that the three identi￿ed shocks explain a consid-
erable portion of the volatility and of the persistence of the two variables in all countries.
For example, in the US, they explain 65-75 % of the persistence of output growth and
in￿ ation and 75-85 % of the variance of output growth and in￿ ation on average over the
sample, while in the Euro are they explain 55-60 % of the level of output growth persistence
and variance and 85-90 % of in￿ ation persistence and variance on average over the sample.
Interestingly, these percentages are relatively stable across time and across frequencies: on
average over time and across frequencies, the three shocks explain 65-75 % of output growth
variability and 70-80 % of in￿ ation variability across countries.
Figure 4 reports the decomposition of interest. The ￿rst column considers US statistics,
the second Euro area statistics and the third UK statistics. The ￿rst row refers to in￿ ation
persistence, the second to in￿ ation volatility, the third to output growth persistence and
the last one to output growth volatility. In each box, each path represents the time pro￿le
which would have materialized if only one type of shock were present.
A few striking features of the ￿gure are worth discussing. First, in each country the
contribution of each of the structural shocks to in￿ ation persistence and volatility is similar.
Hence, sources of in￿ ation persistence are the same as those of in￿ ation volatility. Second,
the sharp increase observed in the 1970s and the subsequent decline in both statistics appear
to be primarily due to demand disturbances, even though the relative importance of real
demand and monetary shocks di⁄ers across countries. Supply shocks, although less crucial
on average, also contribute to the swings in US and UK in￿ ation persistence and volatility
in this period. Interestingly, all three shocks contribute to the slight increase in in￿ ation
volatility and persistence observed in the US and the Euro area in the late 1990s.
Third, variations in output growth persistence and volatility are driven by di⁄erent
shocks in di⁄erent countries and what drives output growth persistence is often di⁄erent
than what drives output volatility within countries. In the US, supply and real demand
shocks are largely responsible for the U-shaped pro￿le of the persistence of output growth,
while monetary and supply shocks give to output growth volatility the observed U-shaped
pro￿le. In the Euro area, the peak observed just around 1980 in output growth persistence
is due to monetary and supply shocks and the increase in output growth volatility in the
1990s is equally due to the three structural shocks, with monetary and real demand shocks
showing the largest variations over time. Finally, in the UK the U-shaped pattern in output
growth volatility is primarily due to supply disturbances, while all three shocks contribute
12to time variations in output growth persistence.
We would like to stress the novelty of the exercise we conduct. For the US, Canova
and Gambetti (2004), Sims and Zha (2006) and Primiceri (2005), provide evidence on the
structural dynamics of in￿ ation. However, they do not document the joint dynamics of
structural output growth and in￿ ation and sources of time variation have been analyzed,
to the best of our knowledge, only in Gambetti et. al. (2005). On the other hand, there is
a large literature discussing in￿ ation persistence in the Euro area (see e.g. Gadzinski and
Orlandi (2004), O￿ Really and Whelan (2004) or Marques (2004)), but the evidence is based
on univariate, time series and unstructural analyses. Finally, while Benati and Mumtaz
(forthcoming) perform a structural analysis of the UK economy, their focus is di⁄erent and
do not report our decomposition.
There are three important conclusions one can draw from the evidence we report. First,
both the absolute value and the swings in the magnitude of in￿ ation volatility and per-
sistence in the US and the UK are only partially related to policy shocks. While this
evidence is not necessarily in contrasts with the conventional wisdom, which see in the lack
of activisms of Central Banks the reason for the surge in in￿ ation of the mid-late 1970,
it nevertheless suggests that other macroeconomic shocks played a possibly more impor-
tant role in shaping in￿ ation dynamics over the last 35 years. Second, the determinants
of output growth dynamics are di⁄erent across countries. Third, sources of output growth
and in￿ ation variations di⁄er within a country and what drives output volatility does not
necessarily drive output persistence.
4.3 Does the structure of the economy change?
To go beyond the documentation of the contribution of di⁄erent structural shocks to the
statistics of interest and to understand whether changes in the structure, or changes in
the distribution from which structural shocks are drawn are responsible for the observed
variations in output growth and in￿ ation dynamics, we need to separate the two sources
of variations and analyze their relative contribution in isolation. This is easy to do. In
fact, changes in the transmission of shocks (i.e. time variations in ￿it) re￿ ect changes in
the structure while changes in the cumulative spectrum of structural shocks (
R
￿ Sei(￿)(t))
capture variations in the distribution from which structural shocks are drawn.
We report the time pro￿le of output growth and in￿ ation median responses to our three
structural shocks in the three countries in ￿gures 5 to 7. We have omitted standard error
bands from the ￿gures because they visually complicate the pictures and add little to our
points. Since the magnitude of the impulse is the same in every period, the evolution of
13these responses provides visual evidence of the changes in the transmission of shocks in
isolation from the changes in the posterior distribution of the shocks. Moreover, since the
magnitude of the impulse is also the same across countries, a comparison across ￿gures gives
us an idea of the size of the structural heterogeneities present in the three economies and
of their evolution.
From the ￿gures it appears that time variations in the structure are somewhat limited
in magnitude, but when they occur they tend to display similarities across countries. For
example, while the shape of output growth responses to the three shocks has hardly changed
over time, one can notice a signi￿cant increase in the contemporaneous output growth re-
sponse to demand shocks since the early 1980s in all countries. Responses of in￿ ation display
some more evidence of time variations. In the US in the mid-late 1970s, in￿ ation responses
to all shocks were much more persistent than at any other date and the magnitude of the
di⁄erences is substantial. Furthermore, the impact e⁄ect of demand shocks on in￿ ation
has somewhat permanently increased since the late 1980s. In the UK, a similar e⁄ect is
present in the 1970s, in particular, in the responses to demand disturbances. Noticeable
is also the change in the lagged responses to monetary shocks: in the last few years the
deep dip present in the 1970s disappears. In the Euro area contemporaneous responses to
demand shocks increase over time and the pro￿le of the ￿rst few responses to monetary
shocks displays visible time variations. Interestingly, all types of shocks have a larger e⁄ect
on output growth in the US and the UK than in the Euro area but the in￿ ation e⁄ects are
comparable. Hence, the real side of the Euro economy appears to be much more sluggish
in response to shocks than the one of the US or the UK.
To the best of our knowledge, the increase responsiveness of US output growth to demand
shocks in the 1990s has not been documented before. Such an e⁄ect could be explained in
a variety of ways. In a ￿ exible price model, demand shocks exercise their e⁄ects on real
activity because of wealth e⁄ects. Hence, the increased responsiveness of output growth to
demand shocks could be accounted for by an increased elasticity of labour supply and/or
a stronger habit persistence mechanism. In a sticky price model, higher responsiveness of
output growth to demand conditions is obtained either via an increase in the stickiness of
the price level or via a reduction of the costs associated with hiring capital and labour, with
the second alternative being probably more attractive to explain the US experience. Hence,
regardless of the model one uses, variations in the way labour markets work could account
for both the temporary and the more long run changes in the US economy.
The 1970s in the UK are also an interesting case to study since demand shocks (and,
to some extent, monetary shocks) produce time varying responses in in￿ ation but not in
14output growth. As far as we know, only Khan and Rudolf (2005) have studied why such
a phenomenon may have appeared and attribute it to changes in the wage indexation
mechanism and in the stock of consumer habits.
Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006) have tried to link variations in output volatility with
changes in the nature of news. In particular, they claim that a larger volume of news
induces a better forecast of output growth and, therefore, a reduction of output volatility.
While such an explanation can account for the decrease of output volatility in the 1980s, it
has hard time to explain why volatility and persistence jointly decreased over the period.
Moreover, to explain the 1990s, we need that either the volume of news declines or that
news become noisier, both of which seem unlikely. Our ￿nding that demand shocks exercise
a much stronger e⁄ect on output growth in the period seems more plausible.
All in all, we conclude that, excluding the 1970s, and the 1990s in the US, changes in
the structure have been somewhat limited in all three countries and trends in one direction
or another are largely absent.
4.4 Does the volatility of the structural shocks change?
Next, we examine the magnitude and the pro￿le of time variations in the volatility of struc-
tural shocks. We plot the estimated posterior median of the volatility of the three structural
shocks in ￿gures 8 to 10. For each country, real demand shocks are those associated with the
￿rst structural equation (normalized on output), supply shocks with the second structural
equation (normalized on in￿ ation) and the monetary policy shocks with the third structural
equation (normalized on the nominal interest rate).
As it was the case for the transmission of structural shocks, the time pro￿le of the vari-
ability of the three structural shocks displays some interesting similarities across countries.
For example, in all countries, the structural volatilities of the three shocks are somewhat
smaller since the 1980s, while in the 1970s the volatility of monetary shocks was high relative
to historical standards.
In the US, the variability of real demand and monetary shocks has an important time
trend. Since the variability of demand shocks is the largest of all (demand shocks are
twice as volatile as monetary policy shocks and up to 4 times as volatile as supply shocks),
and displays a permanent decrease in the early 1980s, the increased stability in in￿ ation
and output growth probably results from a sizable decline in the volatility of these shocks.
The variability of monetary policy shocks also declines. However, the fall is comparatively
smaller, it predates the Great In￿ ation period and appears to be unrelated to changes in
in￿ ation expectations, which start declining only in the early 1980s. We provide more
15evidence on this issue in the next subsection. This evidence is in contrast with the one of
Arias, et. al. (2006) who, using a business cycle accounting exercise, claim that the decline
in US output volatility is almost entirely explained by a decline in the volatility of TFP
shocks. Since it is well known that TFP shocks capture a number of demand shocks, their
technology shocks may not have much to do with those we recover.
For the Euro area, trend variations in the volatility of structural shocks are visible only
for real demand disturbances. Interestingly, there is a negative correlation between the
time pro￿le of the variability in monetary policy and supply shocks, on one hand, and real
demand shocks, on the other. For this reason, the increase volatility of output growth in
the 1990s and the high level of in￿ ation persistence and variability in the 1970s are largely
coincident with the increase in the volatility of supply and monetary policy disturbances.
For the UK, trend variations in the volatility of structural shocks are, by and large,
absent. The Great In￿ ation of the 1970s is associated with an increase in the volatility
of supply and monetary policy shocks, while the increased volatility of demand shocks
accounts for the increase in in￿ ation persistence and volatility observed in the mid-1980s.
Benati and Mumtaz (2006) claim that had the volatility of shocks other than monetary
policy been unchanged, the Great In￿ ation would not have occurred. Our results disagree
somewhat with this interpretation: we con￿rm that the variability of all shocks considerably
increased in the 1970s. However, the increase in the variability of supply and demand shocks
is dwarfed by the increase in the variability of monetary policy shocks, which grew by about
50 % from the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s.
To summarize, we detect changes in the structure of the economies as well as changes
in the volatility of structural disturbances in all countries. Changes in the structure are
noticeable in the responses of in￿ ation to real demand shocks. Changes in the volatility of
the structural shocks have been more pervasive and appear to be coincident with the changes
in persistence and volatilities documented in ￿gures 1 to 3. In general, it is impossible
to account for the Great In￿ ation of the 1970s and for the substantive output growth
of the 1990s with one single explanation. In the US changes in the transmission and in
the variability of demand shocks appear to be important; in the Euro area changes in
the transmission and the volatility of monetary policy shocks and in the volatility of supply
shocks matter; in the UK changes in the transmission of demand shocks and in the volatility
of supply and of policy shocks account for output growth and in￿ ation dynamics.
164.5 The nature of the structural shocks
Although we have argued that our shocks are structural, there is always the possibility
that they are mongrels and capture a number of factors, going from omitted variables to
shocks with similar characteristics, and this is particularly important in small scale VAR
systems like the ones we are considering here. In addition, it is possible that our econometric
approach is weak in detecting local alternatives and may be attributing to shock volatilities
structural variations in the transmission or vice versa. We have therefore examined how
our three structural shocks relate, for example, to in￿ ation expectations, extracted from
the slope of the domestic term structure of interest rates assuming a constant real interest
rate throughout the period, and to real commodity price shocks, computed as residuals of
AR(3) univariate regressions.
Table 3: Cross Correlations
In￿ ation Expectations Commodity prices shocks
-1 0 1 -1 0 1
US Supply shocks 0.16 0.28 0.39 -0.16 -0.07 -0.00
US Demand shocks -0.23 -0.10 0.01 0.12 0.17 0.21
US Monetary shocks -0.16 -0.05 0.04 -0.08 -0.03 0.00
Euro Supply shocks -0.03 0.11 0.25 -0.07 -0.00 -0.07
Euro Demand shocks -0.10 0.05 0.21 0.08 0.15 0.22
Euro Monetary shocks -0.13 -0.09 0.04 0.14 0.17 0.27
UK Supply shocks -0.17 0.02 0.11 -0.13 -0.05 0.02
UK Demand shocks -0.10 0.05 0.19 0.04 0.10 0.16
UK Monetary shocks -0.16 -0.00 0.13 -0.04 0.02 0.09
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) have shown that when indeterminacies are present, shocks
to in￿ ation expectations matter for the dynamics of output growth and in￿ ation and they
induce e⁄ects on these two variables which are roughly equivalent to those generated by
supply shocks. It is therefore particularly important to check that our structural shocks do
not correlate with changes in in￿ ation expectations. We have already argued that our choice
of identi￿cation restrictions should, in principle, avoid this confusion. Table 3 con￿rms this
point: except for the US, the contemporaneous correlation of all shocks with changes in
in￿ ation expectations is insigni￿cant. In addition, there are reasons to believe that even for
the US, structural supply shocks are relatively free of variations related to in￿ ation expecta-
tions. The common wisdom in fact suggests that in￿ ation expectations were an important
driving force for the in￿ ation dynamics in the 1970s but not afterwards. Therefore, if our
supply shocks proxy for changes in in￿ ation expectations, we should observe large changes
17in the responses to these shocks and/or large changes in their variability. However, as we
have documented, supply shocks explain little of the dynamics of US in￿ ation in the 1970s
and 1980s and their variability is roughly unchanged over the whole sample period.
Our measure of in￿ ation expectations is also uncorrelated with monetary policy shocks
at leads and lags in all three countries and this is true even if we restrict attention to
the 1990s. Therefore, if in￿ ation expectations independently matter for describing central
banks￿behaviour, they must enter the policy rule with a very small coe¢ cient.
Our structural shocks appear to be also largely uncorrelated with shocks to the real price
of commodities. In particular, our estimated supply shocks do not signi￿cantly comove with
such shocks, while lagged shocks to the real price of commodities correlate with real demand
shocks in the US and real demand and monetary policy shocks in the Euro area.
Are shocks driving the three economies common? To investigate this possibility we have
computed cross country contemporaneous correlation among shocks of the same type. The
largest correlation is between real demand shocks in US and Euro area and it is a mere
0.13. Lagged correlations are somewhat larger: for example, current real demand shocks in
the Euro area are signi￿cantly correlated with one period lagged demand shocks in the US
(point estimate is 0.26) and current supply shocks in the UK are marginally correlated with
one period lagged supply shocks in the US (point estimate is 0.21). On the other hand,
Euro area and UK shocks appear to be unrelated at both leads and lags.
To sum up, the structural shocks we have recovered do not stand-in for in￿ ation expec-
tations, an important variable omitted from the estimated speci￿cation. Also, they hardly
correlate with shocks to the real price of commodities and display a highly idiosyncratic
nature across countries. Hence, the similarities displayed by in￿ ation (and output growth)
dynamics across countries, can not be the result of common shocks.
5 Conclusions
This paper investigates the nature and the causes of the structural changes in output growth
and in￿ ation dynamics in the US, the UK and the Euro area. We contribute to the existing
literature in two distinct ways: ￿rst, we jointly examine the dynamics of output growth and
in￿ ation from a structural point of view. Second, we compare sources of structural time
variations of output growth and in￿ ation dynamics across countries.
We address three main questions. First, are there structural changes in the volatility and
the persistence of output growth and in￿ ation? Are they comparable in size and timing
across countries? Second, what are the reasons for these changes? Do they re￿ ect time
18variations in the transmission or in the size and the nature of structural shocks? Third, are
there common sources of variations across countries?
The results of our investigation can be summarized as follows. We show that there are
important similarities in the structural dynamics of in￿ ation across countries over the last
35 years. However, structural output growth dynamics acquired signi￿cant cross country
similarities only since the early 1990s.
Swings in the magnitude of volatilities and persistence are typically accounted for by a
combination of all three structural shocks. We document that sources of in￿ ation persistence
and volatility are similar and that sources of output growth dynamics vary across countries.
Within a country, sources of output growth and in￿ ation variations are di⁄erent.
Time variations in the structure of the three economies appear to have been limited in
time and scope and permanent shifts, in one direction or another, are largely absent. The
1970s in the US and the UK and the 1990s in the US are notable exceptions. Changes in
the volatilities of structural shocks are as least as important as changes in the structure to
account for the evidence. In general, it is impossible to explain the Great In￿ ation of the
1970s and the substantive output growth of the 1990s with one single explanation. In the US
changes in the transmission and in the variability of demand shocks appear to be important;
in the Euro area changes in the transmission and the volatility of monetary policy shocks
and in the volatility of supply shocks matter; in the UK changes in the transmission of
demand shocks and in the volatility of supply and monetary policy shocks account for the
observed output growth and in￿ ation dynamics.
There are many interesting questions which, for reasons of space, we have left out of
the paper. For example, one could investigate the relationship between monetary policy
activism and the dynamics of output growth and in￿ ation and therefore shed light on the
bad luck vs. bad policy controversy, or examine how the slope of the Phillips curve is related
to the shocks we have recovered. One could also try to understand why the Euro area is
so di⁄erent from the US and the UK, at least until the 1990s, and why output growth
dynamics appear to converge after that date. We leave all these issues for future research.
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This appendix describes the estimation approach we use in the paper.
Let T be the end of the estimation sample and K1 be the number of periods for which
the identifying restrictions must be satis￿ed. Let HT = ￿(’T) be a matrix whose columns
represent orthogonal points in the hypershere and let ’T be a vector in R6 whose elements
are U[0;1] random variables. Let MT be the set of impulse response functions satisfying
the restrictions and let F(MT) be an indicator function which is one if the identifying
restrictions are satis￿ed, that is, if (￿i
T+1;0;:::;￿i
T+K1;K1￿1) 2 MT, and zero otherwise.
The joint prior for (￿T+K1, ￿T, ￿T; HT) is





t=1 f(￿tj￿t￿1;￿t;￿t) is truncated normal.
We assume that ￿0 and ￿0 have independent inverse Wishart distributions with scale
matrices ￿ ￿0, ￿ ￿0 and degrees of freedom ￿01 and ￿02, and set ￿t = ￿1￿t￿1+￿2￿0; 8t, where
￿1;￿2 are parameters. We also assume that ￿0 is truncated Gaussian, independent of ￿T
and ￿T, i.e. f(￿0) / I(￿0)N(￿ ￿; ￿ P). Finally, p(HT) is assumed to be uniform.
We ￿ calibrate￿prior parameters using estimates obtained from ￿xed coe¢ cient VARs.
We set ￿ ￿ equal to the point estimates of the coe¢ cients and ￿ P to the estimated covariance
matrix. ￿ ￿0 is equal to the sum of squares of VAR innovations, ￿ ￿0 = % ￿ P and ￿01 = ￿02 = 4
(so as to make the prior close to non-informative). We examined two values, % = 0:0001
and 0:001, which imply that a-priori time variation accounts for roughly, 1 or 10 % of the
total coe¢ cients standard deviation. Results are independent of this choice.
Since the statistics we compute depend on ￿T+k;k, S and HT, we ￿rst characterize the
posterior of ￿T+K;￿T;￿T, which are used to construct ￿T+k;k and S, and then describe
how to sample from them.
To draw posterior sequences we need p(HT;￿T+K
T+1 ;￿T;￿T;￿TjyT), which is analytically










where pu(￿T;￿T;￿TjyT) ￿ f(yTj￿T;￿T;￿T)f(￿Tj￿T;￿T)p(￿T;￿T) is the posterior density
of the parameters when no restrictions are imposed.
Given (10), draws for the structural parameters can be obtained as follows:
201. Draw (￿T;￿T;￿T) from pu(￿T;￿T;￿TjyT) via the Gibbs sampler (see below). Apply
the ￿lter I(￿T) to eliminate draws which produce explosive systems
2. Given (￿T;￿T;￿T), draw future states ￿T+K
T+1 , i.e. draw uT+k from N(0;￿T) and
iterate in ￿T+k = ￿T+k￿1 + uT+k, K times. Apply the ￿lter I(￿T+K
T+1 ).
3. Draw ’i;T, i = 1;:::;6, from a U[0;1]. Draw HT = ￿(’T).







T+K;K￿1) for each replication ‘. Apply the ￿lter F(MT)‘ and
keep the draws that satisfy the identi￿cation restrictions.
To draw reduced form parameters (step 1 of the algorithm) we iterate on two steps
(see e.g. Cogley and Sargent (2005)). In the ￿rst step, conditional on (yT;￿T;￿T),
pu(￿TjyT;￿T;￿T) = f(￿TjyT;￿T;￿T)
QT￿1
t=1 f(￿tj￿t+1;yt;￿t;￿t) and since all densities on
the right hand side are Gaussian, their conditional means and variances can be computed
using a simulation smoother. In the second step, given ￿T and the data, p(￿tj￿T;yT) =
IW(￿￿1
1t ;￿11);p(￿tj￿T;yT) = IW(￿￿1
1t ;￿12) where ￿1t = ￿ ￿0 +
PT
t=1 "t"0
t, ￿1t = ￿ ￿0 +
PT
t=1 utu0
t, ￿11 = ￿01 + T, ￿12 = ￿02 + T.
In our exercises we used up to 30000 iterations for each T and found that convergence
was relatively easy and obtained in less than 4000 draws. We keep one every eight of the
remaining draws, discard those generating explosive paths and those failing to generate the
identi￿cation restrictions. In the end we are left with roughly 500 draws for each T. Given
a draw for (￿T+K;￿;￿T;HT+1) we calculate ￿T+k;k￿1, compute the posterior median and
the 68% highest credible set out of its posterior at each horizon k.
To compute the posterior distribution for spectra, we use the fact that the spectrum of yt




it, where j￿it(￿)j2 = j
P
j ￿itexp￿i￿jj2
is the squared Fourier transform of the MA coe¢ cients and ￿2
it the variance of the structural
shocks at time t. Therefore, given draws for ￿it(‘) and ￿2
it, we can easily compute posterior




This appendix brie￿ y sketches the features of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model which produces the identifying restrictions we use in the paper.
The economy features a representative household, a continuum of ￿rms, a monetary and
a ￿scal authority. The ￿scal authority spends for both consumption and investment pur-
21poses. Government consumption may yield utility for the agents and government investment
















choosing sequences for private consumption,Ct, hours, Nt, private capital, K
p
t+1; nominal
state-contigent bonds, Dt+1, nominal balances, Mt+1, and government bonds, Bt+1. Here
0 < ￿ < 1 is the subjective discount factor, ￿ > 0 is a risk aversion parameter, 0 < & ￿ 1
regulates the degree of substitutability between private and public consumption and 0 <
a ￿ 1 is the share of public and private goods in consumption. Time is normalized to one




















￿￿1 and ￿ > 1
measures the elasticity of substitution between types of goods. Maximization is subject to





t ) + EtfQt;t+1Dt+1g + R￿1
t Bt+1 + Mt+1 ￿
(1 ￿ ￿l)PtwtNt + [rt ￿ ￿k(rt ￿ ￿p)]PtK
p
t + Dt + Bt ￿ TtPt + Mt + ￿t (11)
where (1 ￿ ￿l)PtwtNt; is the after tax nominal labour income, [rt ￿ ￿k(rt ￿ ￿p)]PtK
p
t is
the after tax nominal capital income (allowing for depreciation), ￿t are nominal pro￿ts
distributed by ￿rms (which are owned by consumers), TtPt are lump-sum taxes, Dt+1 are
holdings of state-contingent nominal bonds, paying one unit of currency in period t+1 if a
speci￿ed state is realized, and Qt;t+1 is their period-t price. Finally, Rt is the gross return










































b ￿ 0 determines the size of the adjustment costs.












tj are private capital and labour inputs hired by ￿rm j; Zt is an aggregate
technology shock and K
g
t is the stock of public capital. Government capital inputs is taken
as given and ￿ ￿ 0 regulates how public capital a⁄ects private production.









22Firms are monopolistic competitors in the goods markets. At each t, each producer
is allowed to reset her price with a constant probability, (1 ￿ ￿); independently of the





















1 ￿ ￿￿MCt+k)g = 0 (15)
where ￿￿ = ￿(￿ ￿ 1)￿1 is a subsidy that, in equilibrium, eliminates the monopolistic
competitive distortion. Given the pricing assumption, the aggregate price index is
Pt = [￿P1￿￿









1 ￿ ￿￿MCt; 8t (17)
Government￿ s income consists of seigniorage, tax revenues minus subsidies to the ￿rms
and proceeds from new debt issue; expenditures consist of consumption and investment






























where 0 < ￿g < 1 is a constant and ￿(:) is the same as for the private sector and I
g
t is
stochastic. In order to guarantee a non-explosive solution for debt (see e.g., Leeper (1991)),








where the superscript ss indicates steady states. Finally, there is an independent monetary





where ￿t is current in￿ ation and ut is a monetary policy shock. Given this rule, the authority
stands ready to supply nominal balances that the private sector demands.




t ;ut]0; evolve according to
log(St) = (I4 ￿ %)log(S) + %log(St￿1) + Vt (22)
where I4 is a 4￿4 identity matrix, % is a 4￿4 diagonal matrix with all the roots less than
one in modulus, S is the mean of S and the 4￿1 innovation vector Vt is a zero-mean, white
noise process. Gambetti et. al. (2005) show that, when parameters are selected randomly
in ranges reported in table A.1, the model jointly generates the sign restrictions we use for
identi￿cation in at least 68% of the cases in response to the four types of shocks.
Table A.1: Parameter values or ranges
￿ discount factor 0.99
(B=Y )ss steady state debt to output ratio 0.3
￿ risk aversion coe¢ cient [0.5,6.0]
1 ￿ a share of public goods in consumption [0.0,0.15]
& elasticity of substitution public/private goods [0.5,3.0]
￿n preference parameter [0.1,0.9]
b adjustment cost parameter [0.1,10]
￿p private capital depreciation rate [0.013,0.05]
￿g public capital depreciation rate [0.010,0.03]
￿ productivity of public capital [0,0.05]
￿ capital share [0.2,0.4]
￿l average labour tax rate [0,0.3]
￿k average capital tax rate [0,0.2]
(Cg=Y )ss steady state Cg=Y ratio [0.07,0.12]
(Ig=Y )ss steady state Ig=Y ratio [0.02,0.04]
￿￿ Taylor￿ s coe¢ cient [0.1,0.4]
￿b coe¢ cient on debt rule [1.05, 2.25]
￿ degree of price stickiness [0.0,0.85]
￿ elasticity of substitution between varieties [7.0,8.0]
#M elasticity of money demand [1.0,10]
￿Cg persistence of C
g
t shock [0.6,0.9]
￿Ig persistence of I
g
t shock [0.6,0.9]
￿Z persistence of Zt shock [0.8,0.95]
￿u persistence of uR
t shock [0.7,0.9]
Also, since the dynamics induced by government expenditure and government invest-
ment shocks on the four variables of interest are qualitatively identical, we lump them
together as real demand shocks in the empirical analysis.
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Figure 1: Persistence and Volatilities, US. 
 
 




























































Figure 2: Persistence and Volatilities, Euro Area.  
 
















































Figure 3: Persistence and Volatilities, UK. 
 
























































































































































Figure 4: Sources of output growth and inflation dynamics. Solid - supply shock. 










































Figure 8: Posterior median of the variances of  structural shocks , US 
 
 


























Figure 9: Posterior median of the variances of structural shocks, Euro Area  
 
























Figure 10: Posterior median of the variances of  structural shocks , UK 
 